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At high enough greenhouse gas (GHG) con-
centrations, climate change might conceivably 
cause catastrophic damages with small but 
nonnegligible probabilities. Other things being 
equal, this should lower the discount rate used 
to evaluate mitigation-investment decisions and 
raise the social cost of carbon (SCC). If the bad 
tail of climate damages is sufficiently fat with 
probability, and if the utility function has rela-
tive risk aversion greater than one, then (at least 
in theory for at least some formulations) this 
insurance-like catastrophe-reducing aspect of 
mitigation investments can be very powerful. In 
the most extreme limit this tail-hedge insurance 
effect can be infinitely strong and can domi-
nate the economic analysis by making the SCC 
infinite. This kind of extreme (and empirically 
unbelievable) limiting result is a version of what 
I have previously labeled the “dismal theorem.”
1
In this paper I use the simplest possible model 
to lay bare the basic structure of the argument. I 
then attempt to place the underlying issues in a 
balanced perspective. The “dismal theorem” of 
an infinite SCC is a theoretical limiting result, 
which relies on particular assumptions that may 
or may not have actual relevance for climate-
change policy depending upon the interaction of 
a variety of empirical factors, functional forms, 
and parameter values. I argue that the main value 
of the “dismal theorem” is to serve as a warning 
flag that a credible economic analysis of climate 
change should seriously consider extreme tail 
values of damages and their associated prob-
abilities because they may have the potential to 
increase the SCC significantly.
1 See Weitzman (2009, 2011). 
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I. A Super-Simple Expository Model
The simplistic model here has two periods. 
Some base case of abatement strategy is given. 
All consumption refers to “effective consump-
tion”—after climate change damages have 
been subtracted. The utility of consumption is 
U(C ). Present consumption is   C  0  . Future con-
sumption is the random variable     ˜  C  , whose 
expected utility is discounted by β. Welfare is 
W = U(  C  0  ) + β E[U(  ˜  C  )], where E is the expec-
tation operator. Let   C  _   represent a catastrophic 
low value of effective consumption that occurs 
with probability p, where both   C  _   and p are con-
sidered to be “very small.”
Suppose that one extra unit of carbon abate-
ment uniformly shifts upwards future consump-
tion by the multiplicative factor θ > 0. (This is 
consistent with having a multiplicative damages 
function.) For utmost simplicity, I now analyze 
only the effect upon the catastrophe outcome, 
which is the main focus of attention for this 
paper. The effect is that with probability p the 
  postabatement level of catastrophic consumption 
is now (1 + θ)  C  _  , instead of the preabatement 
level of   C  _  . Abatement here induces first-order 
stochastic dominance via an upward shift in the 
probability-p point mass:   C  _   → (1 + θ)  C  _  .
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is the (nega-
tive of the) change in   C  0   per small change in 
abatement that would give the same level of 
welfare W as before. In words, it is the willing-
ness to pay for a small extra unit of abatement.
2 
Assume utility is of the CRRA form U(C ) 
=   C 
1−η  /(1 − η), where the coefficient of rela-
tive risk aversion is η > 1. Normalize   C  0   = 1. 
With this specification, the SCC here is readily 
calculated to be
(1) SCC = β  θ  [    p  C  _   
1−η   ] .
2 A procedure for empirically deriving the SCC is 
described, e.g., in Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton 
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I want to analyze the extreme case of a very 
rare, very catastrophic climate event where 
simultaneously  p and   C  _   are both very small. 
Several observers have expressed the belief 
that an essential ingredient in a cost-benefit 
analysis of climate change is the potential for 
a   small-probability high-impact disastrous out-
come.
3 I think it is at least interesting, and may 
perhaps give some useful insights, to inves-
tigate, in the spirit of a kind of “stress test” of 
the model, what happens to the SCC of formula 
(1) in the most extreme limit as simultaneously 
p → 0 and   C  _   → 0.
To get a handle on this limiting issue and 
relate it to the tail fatness of a particular distri-
bution, let us take x = −ln   C  _   as a measure of 
how deep into the bad tail we are. Let p(x) be the 
probability of x. The change of variables from   
C  _   to x allows a convenient conceptualization in 
terms of the fatness or thinness of the probability 
tails of p(x). With   C  _  (x) = exp(−x), formula (1) 
becomes
(2) SCC(x) = βθ  [  p(x)exp((η − 1)x)  ]  .
What happens to SCC(x) as x → ∞? The out-
come depends on how fast p(x) → 0 as x → ∞. 
If the probability p(x) declines in x faster than 
exponentially (like the normal distribution), then 
(abusing terminology)  p(x) is thin tailed and 
SCC(x) in (2) goes to some finite limit as x → ∞. 
This is the kind of situation that can justify a 
“value at risk” type calculation that would cut off 
the distribution for some large  
_
  x   (or, equivalently, 
small p( 
_
  x  )) and ignore what is in the bad tail for 
values x >  
_
  x  . But what happens if p(x) declines 
in x relatively slowly? Suppose (again abusing 
terminology) that the probability distribution p(x) 
is fat tailed, meaning that p(x) → 0 polynomially 
as x → ∞ (like the Student-t distribution). Then 
SCC(x) in formula (2) explodes as x → ∞, and 
a “value at risk” type cut off of the bad tail is not 
legitimate. I investigate this unusual and artificial 
situation in the next section.
II.  A “Dismal Theorem”
Suppose that for large x the probability 
p(x) is polynomial, meaning (for large x) that 
3  See, e.g., Barro (2013); Litterman (2013); Pindyck 
(2013). 
p(x) ∝   x 
−α  , where α > 0. (This is the prototyp-
ical example of the relatively slow asymptotic 
probability convergence to zero that describes 
a fat tail.) Then, under the assumptions of the 
model, we have the following result.
(3)     lim   
x→∞
     
 
     SCC(x) = ∞.
I will call (3) (a form of) the “dismal theo-
rem.” Let us immediately emphasize that which 
is immediately obvious. The “dismal theorem” is 
an absurd result! It cannot be the case that society 
would pay an infinite amount to abate one unit 
of carbon. Something must be very wrong in the 
formulation of the underlying model.
Several things could be seriously wrong with 
the underlying formulation.
4 The limiting prob-
abilities might not be fat-tailed in the exact and 
demanding sense of this model. The CRRA util-
ity function might be inapplicable, at least in 
the limiting range of infinitesimal consumption 
where it yields an unboundedly low value. The 
catastrophic realizations of ever-larger x might 
be occurring in the ever-more-distant future, 
so that in formula (2) one has to take a double 
limit as β → 0 and x → ∞. There might be 
something fundamentally wrong with applying 
the expected present discounted utility frame-
work to such an extreme problem. I refrain from 
listing other possibilities. There are more than 
enough plausible arguments to explain away the 
infinity in the “dismal theorem” result (3).
Formally, it is not difficult to get rid of the 
infinity symbol in equation (3). One easy way is 
to not allow the limit in (3) to occur simply by 
fixing x at some finite value x =  
_
  x   < ∞. This is 
analogous to what “value at risk” cut offs of the 
bad tail attempt to do. But if p(x) represents a 
fat-tailed slowly converging polynomial distri-
bution, then SCC( 
_
  x  ) will be sensitive to   
_
  x  , which 
is not a fully comfortable resolution.
Why might p(x) have a fat-tailed   slowly con-
verging polynomial form? I do not have a good 
answer to this important question. We have very 
little idea about the relevant probability distribu-
tion for the bad tail of extreme catastrophic dam-
ages at high levels of GHG concentrations. I think 
4 See Millner (2013) for an enumeration and evaluation 
of various complaints against the “dismal theorem” that have 
appeared in the literature. Millner concludes with his own 
overall assessment, which I think is fair. MAY 2014 546 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
it is enough justification to simply say that we 
would like to do a stress test to make us aware of 
the theoretical consequences of fat tails, leaving 
in temporary abeyance the empirical relevance.
I wish I could report decisive convincing 
numerical results from modeling catastrophic 
climate change. Alas, and not surprisingly, any 
such results depend on the particular specifica-
tions going into a particular integrated assessment 
model. To get catastrophic climate change to mat-
ter for policy depends on some combination of a 
high-enough probability of occurrence, a high-
enough level of catastrophic damages, strong-
enough tail hedging, a high-enough level of risk 
aversion, low-enough time discounting, and sev-
eral other features. Some researchers have found 
significant tail effects under some seemingly plau-
sible specifications. I think the summary of Dietz 
(2011) is fair: “To what extent does economic 
analysis of climate change depend on low-prob-
ability high-impact events? The short answer is a 
great deal, but not to the exclusion of other factors 
that we already know to be very important …”
III.  Conclusion: Fat Tail  
as Cautionary Tale
If the “dismal theorem” is a reductio ad 
absurdum, what are we left with?
An investment in abatement is shifting upward 
the probability distribution of effective consump-
tion. Instead of    ˜  C   =   C  _   with probability p, a small 
unit investment in abatement makes   ˜  C   = (1 + θ)  C  _   
with probability p. In other words, the decrease 
in damages from an abatement investment is 
equivalent to first-order stochastic dominance in 
the distribution of consumption. How much is 
first-order stochastic dominance in consumption 
worth? Potentially quite a lot if   C  _   is catastrophi-
cally low with a “fat” probability, because it pulls 
us away from the terrible tail with its terrible 
consequences. Abatement in this case represents 
a valuable tail-hedge insurance investment that 
shows itself in a high SCC.
Since the conditions for the “dismal theorem” to 
hold are unusual and open to legitimate criticisms, 
it cannot possibly trump all other considerations. 
Whether some modified version of the “dismal 
theorem” is relevant or not is ultimately an empir-
ical question. Unfortunately, it is an empirical 
question that depends on probability assumptions 
about extreme tail behavior, which are very dif-
ficult to resolve because we know hardly   anything 
about extreme tail probabilities. The nature of tail 
events is that we have little past experience with 
them, and besides, climate change is a unique 
one-off event. This is a basic dilemma for climate 
change. Fat tails may be important, but how can 
we know their relative fatness and the tail-hedging 
effect of reducing extreme damages from a given 
climate-change investment?
The “dismal theorem” is best understood as a 
cautionary tale. A fat tail for rare disasters has the 
potential to dominate economic calculations like 
the SCC. Therefore, analysis of a situation that 
might potentially be catastrophic cannot afford to 
ignore tail behavior. It is not enough in such situ-
ations to look just at measures of central tendency 
or even just at thin-tailed probability distributions. 
Ignorance of the potential fatness of an extreme 
bad tail is not an excuse for ignoring the potential 
fatness of an extreme bad tail. This warning is the 
main message of the “dismal theorem.”
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